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Correlation of positive and negative reciprocity fails to confer an evolutionary advantage:
Phase transitions to elementary strategies
Attila Szolnoki1 and Matjazˇ Perc2
1Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Research Centre for Natural Sciences,
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
2Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Korosˇka cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia
Economic experiments reveal that humans value cooperation and fairness. Punishing unfair behavior is there-
fore common, and according to the theory of strong reciprocity, it is also directly related to rewarding cooperative
behavior. However, empirical data fail to confirm that positive and negative reciprocity are correlated. Inspired
by this disagreement, we determine whether the combined application of reward and punishment is evolutionary
advantageous. We study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to the three elementary strategies of
defection, rewarding and punishment, a fourth strategy combining the later two competes for space. We find
rich dynamical behavior that gives rise to intricate phase diagrams where continuous and discontinuous phase
transitions occur in succession. Indirect territorial competition, spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, as
well as divergent fluctuations of oscillations that terminate in an absorbing phase are observed. Yet despite the
high complexity of solutions, the combined strategy can survive only in very narrow and unrealistic parameter
regions. Elementary strategies, either in pure or mixed phases, are much more common and likely to prevail.
Our results highlight the importance of patterns and structure in human cooperation, which should be considered
in future experiments.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 89.75.Fb
I. INTRODUCTION
Humans have mastered the art of cooperation like no other
species [1, 2]. Regardless of kinship and individual loss, we
work together to achieve feats that are impossible to achieve
alone. We have developed a very keen sense of fairness to
uphold cooperative behavior in our societies [3, 4], and we
frequently punish those that do not cooperate in the pursuit of
personal benefits and elevated status [5–7]. There also exist
evidence for common marmosets and chimpanzees to show
similar preferences regarding altruism and reward division [8,
9], suggesting a long evolutionary history to the human sense
of fairness. Although the origins of this behavior are not fully
understood, there exist evidence for between-group conflicts
[10] and the provisioning for someone else’s young [11] as
viable for igniting the evolution of remarkable other-regarding
abilities of the genus Homo.
Like the origins of cooperative behavior, so too its later de-
velopment and evolution continue to intrigue and stimulate
new research across social and natural sciences [12–16]. Al-
though key mechanisms have been identified that promote the
evolution of cooperation [17], there is still disagreement be-
tween theory and experiment on many key issues. Two exam-
ples have recently attracted notable interest. The first concerns
network reciprocity [18–21], according to which cooperators
are able to exploit the structure of interaction networks to off-
set inherent evolutionary disadvantages over defectors. Re-
cent large-scale human experiments, however, fail to provide
evidence in support of network reciprocity [22]. The second
example is of direct relevance for the present work, and it con-
cerns the strong reciprocity model [23–26]. The later postu-
lates that positive and negative reciprocity are directly cor-
related. In theory, it indeed seems reasonable to assume that
rewarding cooperative behavior and punishing unfair behavior
are to be seen as the two sides of the same preference for fair-
ness. Yet recently gathered empirical data suggest otherwise
[27, 28]. In fact, Yamagishi et al. [27] have performed a se-
ries of experiments and concluded that there is no correlation
between the tendencies to reject unfair offers in the ultimatum
game [29] and the tendencies to exhibit prosocial behavior in
other games [30, 31]. Moreover, the analysis of private house-
hold data from the Socio-Economic Panel of the German In-
stitute for Economics Research presented by Egloff et al. [28]
has revealed that positive and negative reciprocity vary inde-
pendently of each other, thus providing a severe challenge to
the strong reciprocity model of the evolution of human co-
operation. While the rejection of unfair offers, which ought
to be seen equivalent to punishing defection [32], is simply a
tacit strategy for avoiding the imposition of an inferior status,
the act of cooperating appears to have an altogether different
motivational background.
The described disagreement between the strong reciprocity
model and empirical data invites an interdisciplinary ap-
proach, which promises to shed light on the subject from a
different perspective. In the present paper, we therefore apply
evolutionary game theory [33–37] and methods of statistical
physics [38, 39] to determine whether there are evolutionary
advantages to be gained by adopting a strategy that punishes
defectors as well as rewards cooperators, as opposed to doing
just one or the other. While the elementary strategies of re-
warding and punishment have received ample attention in the
recent past [40–45], little is known about their combined ef-
fectiveness. To amend this, we propose and study a modified
spatial public goods game [46, 47], where defectors compete
with cooperators that punish defectors, reward other cooper-
ators, as well as do both. We intentionally leave out coop-
erators that neither reward nor punish in order to avoid the
second-order free-riding problem [48, 49], and to thus be able
to focus solely on the effectiveness of the combined strategy
against the three elementary strategies of defection, rewarding
2and punishment.
As we will show in what follows, although the spatiotem-
poral dynamics of the evolutionary game is very complex and
interesting from the physics point of view, there exist only
narrow and realistically unlikely parameter regions where the
combined strategy is able to survive. Given the lack of notable
evolutionary advantages of correlating positive and negative
reciprocity, the outcome of the experiments by Yamagishi et
al. [27] and Egloff et al. [28] can thus be better understood,
though the complexity of solutions also lends some support to
the strong reciprocity hypothesis as being viable at least under
certain special circumstances. We will present compelling ev-
idence to support these conclusions in section III, while in the
next section we first describe the studied spatial public goods
game and the methods in more detail.
II. PUBLIC GOODS GAME WITH POSITIVE AND
NEGATIVE RECIPROCITY
As a frequently used paradigm of social conflicts and hu-
man cooperation, the public goods game is staged on a square
lattice with periodic boundary conditions where L2 players
are arranged into overlapping groups of size G = 5 such that
everyone is connected to its G − 1 nearest neighbors. Ac-
cordingly, each individual belongs to g = 1, . . . , G different
groups. The square lattice is the simplest of networks that al-
lows us to go beyond the unrealistic well-mixed population
assumption, and as such it allows us to take into account the
fact that the interactions among humans are inherently struc-
tured rather than random. By using the square lattice, we also
continue a long-standing history that begun with the work of
Nowak and May [18], who were the first to show that the most
striking differences in the outcome of an evolutionary game
emerge when the assumption of a well-mixed population is
abandoned for the usage of a structured population. Many
have since followed the same practice [46, 50, 51] (for a re-
view see [14]), and there exist ample evidence in support of
the claim that, especially for games that are governed by group
interactions [47, 52], using the square lattice suffices to reveal
all the feasible evolutionary outcomes, and also that these are
qualitatively independent of the interaction structure.
Initially each player on site x is designated either as a de-
fector (sx = D), cooperator that punishes defectors (sx = P ),
cooperator that rewards other cooperators (sx = R), or coop-
erator that both punishes defectors as well as rewards other
cooperators (sx = B) with equal probability. All three co-
operative strategies (P , R and B) contribute a fixed amount
(here considered being equal to 1 without loss of generality)
to the public good while defectors contribute nothing. The
sum of all contributions in each group is multiplied by the
synergy factor r and the resulting public goods are distributed
equally amongst all the group members irrespective of their
strategies. In addition, a defector suffers a fine β/(G−1) from
each punisher (P or B) within the interaction neighborhood,
which in turn requires the punisher to bear the cost γ/(G− 1)
on each defecting individual in the group. A defector thus
suffers the maximal fine β if it is surrounded solely by pun-
ishers, while a lonely punisher bears the largest cost γ if it is
surrounded solely by defectors. Similarly, every cooperator
is given the reward β/(G − 1) from every R and B player
within the group, while each of them has to bear the cost of
rewarding γ/(G−1) for every cooperator that is rewarded. As
a technical comment, we note that the application of payoffs
normalized by G − 1 enables relevant comparisons with the
evolutionary outcomes on other interaction networks where
players might differ in their degree and group size. Moreover,
we use an equally strong fine and reward at the same cost,
technically the same pair of (β, γ) values for reward and pun-
ishment, which ensures a fair evaluation of the evolutionary
advantage of both strategies. By decoupling these parameters,
for example by administering high fines and low rewards at the
same cost to both punishers and those that reward, would con-
fer an unfair advantage to punishment because it would then
be relatively less costly than rewarding. Since giving equal
chances for success is of paramount importance for assessing
evolutionary viability, we do not decouple β and γ for reward
and punishment, and we also award limitless resources to all
competing strategies.
In agreement with the described rules of the game, the pay-
off values of the four competing strategies obtained from each
group g are thus:
ΠgD = r(NP +NR +NB)/G− β(NP +NB)/(G− 1),
ΠgP = r(NP +NR +NB + 1)/G− γ(ND)/(G− 1) + β(NR +NB)/(G− 1),
ΠgR = r(NP +NR +NB + 1)/G− γ(NP +NR +NB)/(G− 1) + β(NR +NB)/(G− 1),
ΠgB = r(NP +NR +NB + 1)/G− γ + β(NR +NB)/(G− 1),
where Nsx denotes the number of other players with strategy
sx in the group.
Monte Carlo simulations of the public goods game are car-
ried out comprising the following elementary steps. A ran-
domly selected player x plays the public goods game with its
G − 1 partners as a member of all the g = 1, . . . , G groups,
whereby its overall payoff Πsx is thus the sum of all the pay-
offs Πgsx acquired in each individual group. Next, player x
chooses one of its nearest neighbors at random, and the cho-
sen co-player y also acquires its payoff Πsy in the same way.
Finally, player x enforces its strategy sx onto player y with
a probability given by the Fermi function w(sx → sy) =
1/{1 + exp[(Πsy − Πsx)/K]}, where K = 0.5 quantifies
the uncertainty by strategy adoptions [47], implying that bet-
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FIG. 1. Full β− γ phase diagram, as obtained for r = 4.5. Solid red
lines denote continuous phase transitions. If defectors die out strate-
gies R and B become equivalent (see main text for details), hence
the (RB) notation in the lower right corner of the parameter plane.
The vertical resolution hides the intricate structure of the phase dia-
gram for very low values of γ, which we therefore show separately
in Fig. 2.
ter performing players are readily adopted, although it is not
impossible to adopt the strategy of a player performing worse.
Such errors in decision making can be attributed to mistakes
and external influences that adversely affect the evaluation of
the opponent. Each Monte Carlo step (MCS) gives a chance
for every player to enforce its strategy onto one of the neigh-
bors once on average.
The average fractions of defectors (ρD), cooperators that
punish (ρP ), cooperators that reward (ρR), and cooperators
that do both (ρB) on the square lattice were determined in the
stationary state after a sufficiently long relaxation time. De-
pending on the actual conditions (proximity to phase transi-
tion points and the typical size of emerging spatial patterns),
the linear system size was varied from L = 400 to 7200 and
the relaxation time was varied from 104 to 105 MCS to ensure
that the statistical error is comparable with the line thickness
in the figures. We note that the random initial state may not
necessarily yield a relaxation to the most stable solution of
the game even at such a large system size (L = 7200). To
verify the stability of different solutions, we have therefore
applied prepared initial states (see Fig. 10 in [53]), and we
have followed the same procedure as described previously in
[54]. Next we proceed with presenting the main results.
III. RESULTS
Systematic Monte Carlo simulations are performed to re-
veal phase diagrams for two representative values of the syn-
ergy factor r. In the absence of reward and punishment, coop-
erators survive only if r > 3.74, and they are able to defeat de-
fectors completely for r > 5.49 [47]. Taking these as bench-
mark values, we focus on r = 4.5 and r = 2.5. For r = 4.5
cooperators are able to coexist with defectors without support
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FIG. 2. Enlarged part of the full β − γ phase diagram depicted in
Fig. 1, zooming in on the very small (∼ 103 smaller than β) values
of γ. Solid red lines denote continuous phase transitions, while the
blue dashed line denotes discontinuous phase transitions. The later
are due to indirect territorial competition between strategies P andB
who compete independently against the defectors. A representative
cross-section of the phase diagrams is presented in Fig. 3.
from additional strategies, solely on the basis of network reci-
procity. This can thus be considered as lenient conditions for
the evolution of public cooperation. For r = 2.5, on the other
hand, cooperators are unable to survive in the absence of re-
ward or punishment, and this are hence adverse conditions for
cooperative behavior to prevail. For both values of r, we de-
termine the stationary fractions of strategies when varying the
reward/fine β and the cost γ. The transition points and the
type of phase transitions are identified from Monte Carlo data
collected with a sufficiently high accuracy (and frequency) in
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FIG. 3. Cross-section of the phase diagram depicted in Fig. 2, as
obtained for γ = 0.0007. Depicted are stationary fractions of the
four competing strategies in dependence on β. Stable solutions are
denoted along the top axis. Unlike the D+P → D+B phase tran-
sition denoted dashed blue in Fig. 2, in this cross-section all phase
transitions are continuous.
4FIG. 4. Snapshots of the square lattice, showing a characteristic evolution from a prepared initial state, as obtained for γ = 0.0015, β = 0.1
and r = 4.5. Strategies D, P , R and B are depicted red, green, dark blue and light blue, respectively (the same colors were used in Fig. 3).
Time runs from the top left panel towards the bottom right panel at 0, 100, 210, 300, 1130 and 8700 Monte Carlo steps, respectively. At 0
MCS the game is initiated from a prepared initial state (the upper left domain is a mixture of strategies P , R and B) to allow the usage of a
very small system size (L = 150) that still allows to infer strategy configurations in sufficient detail. At 100 MCS D (red) percolate slightly
into green, light blue and dark blue clusters, indicating that all three cooperative strategies could form a two-strategy phase with defectors. At
210 MCS the borders of the three mentioned two-strategy phases (D + P , D + R, D + B) meet, and at 300 MCS it can be observed that
strategy B (light blue) is capable to invade into the D + P phase while strategy R is unable to do the same. While R and B are neutral in the
absence of D, in direct competition against D the strategy B is more effective and thus continues to crowd out strategy R, as can be inferred
at 1130 MCS. Interestingly, strategy P has a small advantage over strategy B because the former can spare the cost of rewarding. Yet this
advantage is sufficient for P to survive in the bulk of strategy B. The last panel, taken at 8700 MCS, depicts a typical stationary pattern where
strategies D, P and B coexist to form the D + P +B phase.
the close vicinity of the transition points. Finally, the phase
boundaries, separating different stable solutions, are plotted
in the full β − γ phase diagrams. The obtained quantitative
results are discussed in detail in the following two subsections.
A. Synergy factor r = 4.5
The phase diagram depicted in Fig. 1 suggests that at such
a high value of r the far more effective action to outperform
defectors is punishment rather than rewarding. The pure (or
absorbing because the applied dynamical rule leaves the phase
unchanged once the system arrives there)D phase in the upper
left corner of the β−γ plane first gives way to the mixedD+P
phase, and subsequently to the pure P phase as the fine (cost)
increases (decreases). Only if the cost is negligible and the
fine/reward is large are rewarding strategies able to survive.
In this case defectors die out very soon, and from there on
strategies R and B become equivalent since there is nobody
left to punish. For the same reason strategy P transforms to
that of ordinary cooperation. Accordingly, strategies R and
B are able to coexist alongside strategy P as long as the cost
of rewarding is sufficiently small to offset the second-order
free-riding (because P do not contribute to rewarding other
cooperators). The phase is denoted appropriately as P+(RB)
in the lower right corner of Fig. 1.
Yet Fig. 1 fails to convey the full story behind the depicted
phase diagram. For very low values of γ (∼ 103 smaller than
β), the studies spatial public goods game reveals its true po-
tential to yield rich dynamical behavior that gives rise to a
truly intricate phase diagram. As can be observed in Fig. 2,
no less than seven successive phase transitions can occur upon
varying a single parameter (increasing β at a fixed value of γ).
In addition to the pure P phase, we can observe two-strategy
D + P , D + B and P + (RB) (note that here R and B are
equivalent strategies) phases, three strategy D + P + B and
D+P +R phases, and even the four-strategyD+P +R+B
phase. While the majority of phase transitions is continuous,
the D + P → D + B phase transition is discontinuous due
to an indirect territorial competition (see [55, 56] for further
examples of this phenomenon) between strategies P and B.
The two compete independently against the defectors, and the
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FIG. 5. Full β − γ phase diagram, as obtained for r = 2.5. Solid
red lines denote continuous phase transitions, while dashed blue lines
denote discontinuous phase transitions. More precisely, the dashed
blue line between phases D and D(B) indicates that there would be
a discontinuous phase transition if only D and B strategies were ini-
tially present in the system (in other words, the frontier of dominance
between strategies D and B is delineated). The same holds for the
dashed blue line separating phases D(B) and P . The three-strategy
D + P + B phase is separated with a dotted blue line to emphasize
that there are two very different ways in which this solution can give
way to the D(B) phase. In particular, at smaller fines the transition
is continuous because the average fraction of strategy P gradually
decays to zero (see Fig. 6 for a quantitative insight). At larger fines,
however, the averages of all three strategies remain finite, but the
amplitude of oscillations diverges regardless of the system size (see
Fig. 8 for details), which ultimately results in an abrupt termination
of cyclic dominance between the three strategies (see Fig. 7). The no-
tation of the P + (RB) phase at the lower right corner of the phase
diagram has the same meaning as described in the caption of Fig. 1.
victor is determined by whoever is more effective. The na-
ture of the other phase transitions is illustrated quantitatively
in Fig. 3, which shows a cross-section across β for the most
interesting value of γ.
Despite the complexity of solutions, the relevance of the
presented results for the main question addressed in this study
is quickly revealed. The dashed blue line in Fig. 2, marking
the discontinuousD+P → D+B phase transition, conveys
directly that the combined strategy B is more effective than
the elementary strategy P only if β increases [if conditions
for rewarding and sanctioning become more lenient (the two
actions become less costly)], and this only when the costs are
already negligible (∼ 103 smaller than the administered re-
wards and fines). Accordingly, we conclude that, at least for
high values of the synergy factor r, there are no notable evolu-
tionary advantages associated by correlating positive (reward-
ing) and negative (punishment) reciprocity in a single strategy.
This agrees with the empirical data presented by Yamagishi
et al. [27] and Egloff et al. [28], who failed to observe the
same correlation in human experiments. On the other hand,
it should not be overlooked that the combined strategy B is
viable and that it does convey some advantages (albeit in very
narrow and rather unrealistic parameter regions), which thus
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FIG. 6. Cross-section of the phase diagram depicted in Fig. 5, as
obtained for β = 0.37. Depicted are stationary fractions of the four
competing strategies in dependence on γ. Stable solutions are de-
noted along the top axis. In this cross-section the D + P + B →
D(B) phase transition is continuous because the average fraction of
strategy P gradually decays to zero as γ increases.
also lends some support to the strong reciprocity model [24].
To demonstrate just how the combined strategy B may sur-
vive, we show in Fig. 4 a series of snapshots from a pre-
pared initial state (applied solely to allow the usage of a rel-
atively small system size), which eventually evolves towards
the three-strategy D + P + B phase. Based on this example,
it could be argued that adopting strategy B does in fact confer
an advantage over strategy R, which succumbs to the evolu-
tionary pressure stemming from the three surviving strategies.
However, as can be observed at a glance from the depicted
phase diagrams presented in Figs. 1 and 2, this is limited to a
very narrow and specific parameter range, which is practically
invisible at normal resolution (see Fig. 1). In addition, we em-
phasize that strategy B is slightly less effective than strategy
P (see Fig. 3 for the stationary fractions of the two strategies).
Thus, although the combined strategy B might appear as a
good choice in some of the parameter regions within Fig. 2,
it is still second best to the elementary strategy P adopting
solely punishment.
B. Synergy factor r = 2.5
If the conditions for the evolution of public cooperation be-
come harsh, as is the case for r = 2.5, the relations between
the competing strategies change quite significantly. The phase
diagram presented in Fig. 5 reveals that, besides the expected
extension of the pure D phase, the parameter region where
strategy B can survive also becomes larger. Furthermore,
there is a significant change in the nature of phase transitions.
Unlike at r = 4.5 (see Fig. 1), here discontinuous phase tran-
sitions dominate, which has to do with the spontaneous emer-
gence of cyclic dominance [57–60] between strategies D, P
and B. In particular, within the three-strategy D + P + B
phase strategy D outperforms strategy P , strategy P outper-
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FIG. 7. Cross-section of the phase diagram depicted in Fig. 5, as
obtained for β = 0.55. Depicted are stationary fractions of the four
competing strategies in dependence on γ. Stable solutions are de-
noted along the top axis. Unlike in Fig. 6, here the D + P + B →
D(B) phase transition is discontinuous because the amplitude of os-
cillations diverges independently of the system size (see Fig. 8 for
details) as γ increases.
forms strategyB, while strategyB again outperforms strategy
D. It is important to note that at r = 4.5 the stability of none
of the three-strategy phases, and also not of the four-strategy
phase, has been due to cyclic dominance. Instead, as Fig. 4
illustrates, there the stability was warranted by the stable co-
existence of the strategies, rather than by oscillations that are
brought about by cyclic dominance.
As was frequently the case before [53, 54, 61, 62], here too
the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance brings with
it fascinating dynamical processes that are driven by pattern
formation, by means of which the phase may terminate. Fig-
ures 6 and 7 feature two characteristic cross-sections of the
phase diagram presented in Fig. 5, which reveal two qualita-
tively very different ways for theD+P+B cyclic dominance
phase to give way to the D(B) phase [here D(B) indicates
that either a pure D or a pure B phase can be the final state if
starting from random initial conditions]. The process depicted
in Fig. 6 is relatively straightforward. Here the average frac-
tions of strategies P and B decay due to the increasing cost
γ, which ultimately results in the vanishing average value of
the fraction of strategy P . The closed cycle of dominance is
therefore interrupted and the D + P +B phase terminates.
The situation for β = 0.55 is much more peculiar and in-
teresting. As results presented in Fig. 7 demonstrate, here the
average values of all three strategies remain finite. Hence, the
termination of the D+P +B phase must have a different ori-
gin than at β = 0.37 presented in Fig. 6. In fact, for β = 0.55
it is the amplitude of oscillations that increases with increas-
ing values of γ. And it is the increase in the amplitude that
ultimately results in a uniform absorbing phase regardless of
the system size. At this point it is crucial to emphasize that
the increase of the amplitude of oscillation is not a finite-size
effect. Although in spatial systems with cyclic dominance it
is typical to observe oscillations with increasingly smaller am-
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FIG. 8. Fluctuations of the amplitude of oscillations χ in dependence
on the vicinity to the critical value of the cost γc = 0.1242(6) for
β = 0.55 and different system sizes, as indicated in the legend. The
slope of the power-law exponent (solid line) is 1, indicating divergent
fluctuation as γ approaches the critical value.
plitude as the system size is increased, this does not hold in the
present case. To demonstrate this, we measure the fluctuations
in the stationary state according to
χ =
L2
M
M∑
ti=1
〈
(ρD(ti)− ρD)
2
〉
(1)
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FIG. 9. Cross-section of the phase diagram depicted in Fig. 5, as
obtained for γ = 0.05. Depicted are stationary fractions of the four
competing strategies in dependence on β. Stable solutions are de-
noted along the top axis. In this cross-section the pure D phase first
gives was to a very narrow interval where the two-strategy D + B
phase precedes the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance be-
tween the strategies D, P and B. The last (from left to right)
D + P + B → P phase transition is qualitatively similar to the
D + P + B → D(B) phase transition depicted in Fig. 6, only that
here it is the fraction of strategy B that decays to zero as β increases,
and which thus interrupts the closed cycle of dominance (in Fig. 6 it
is the fraction of strategy P as γ increases that has the same effect).
7FIG. 10. Snapshots of the square lattice, showing a characteristic evolution from a prepared initial state, as obtained for γ = 0.1, β = 0.55,
and r = 2.5. Strategies D, P , R and B are encoded with the same color as used in Fig. 4. Time runs from the top left panel towards the
bottom right panel at 0, 100, 1800, 4100, 4240 and 4610 Monte Carlo steps, respectively. At 0 MCS the game is initiated from the same
prepared initial state, and for the same reason, as described in the caption of Fig. 4. At 100 MCS, it can be observed that strategies P (green)
and R (dark blue) are both weaker than strategy D (red), and accordingly their isolated islands shrink. Conversely, the combined strategy B
is more effective when competing alone against the defectors, and thus the light blue island grows. Moreover, in the absence of defectors the
strategy P can exploit rewarding strategies and spread fast in the bulk of the mixed domain (left upper circle). It is also worth pointing out that
the B domain would grow endlessly in the sea of defectors if it would not meet the elementary strategy P that is able to exploit it. At 1800
MCS the final solution is practically formed, and from here on traveling waves dominate the spatial grid. At 4100 MCS it can be observed that
the strategy B can spread towards strategy D, and based on this it may control a significant portion of the lattice for a short period of time. At
4240 MCS, however, the strategy P can easily invade the bulk of the B domain, but in the absence of the latter it itself becomes vulnerable
against the defectors. This cycle of dominance is repeated from 4610 MCS onwards, which is a very similar configuration as the one at 1800
MCS. Naturally, the oscillations become more intense as we approach the edge of D + P + B phase in Fig. 5, and the evolution can easily
terminate in an absorbing phase if the system size is not sufficiently large.
where ρD is the average value of the fraction of defectors
(a similar quantity can be calculated for the other strategies
as well). As Fig. 8 shows, the scaled quantity χ is size-
independent, thus indicating a divergent fluctuation as γ ap-
proaches the critical value. The three-strategy D + P + B
phase is therefore unable to exist beyond this value despite
the fact that the average fractions of all three strategies are
far from zero. Instead, the phase terminates via a discontinu-
ous phase transition towards the D(B) phase, as depicted in
Fig. 5. Notably, within the D(B) phase either the pure D or
the pure B phase can be the final state, depending on which
strategy dies out first.
With this, however, we have not yet covered all the details
of the phase diagram presented in Fig. 5. In addition, there are
namely the same pure P and two-strategy P + (RB) phases
observable that we have already reported above for r = 4.5
(see Fig. 1), only that at r = 2.5 they are shifted further to-
wards higher values of β. This is understandable, given that
the lesser support for public cooperation due to a lower value
of the synergy factor needs to be offset by higher fines and re-
wards. Moreover, we must not overlook the existence, albeit
a very subtle one, of the two-strategy D+B phase, the emer-
gence of which is quantitatively described in the cross-section
presented in Fig. 9. This is the only stable solution where
solely the combined strategy B coexists with defectors, and
where thus the correlation of negative and positive reciprocity
truly outperforms elementary strategies P and R. As in all
the previously outlined cases, however, in this case too this
advantage is minute and limited to a very narrow region in the
phase diagram.
In general, the harsher conditions for the evolution of pub-
lic cooperation lend more support for the combined strategy
to survive, as indeed the regions on the β− γ parameter plane
where B can prevail become quite extensive at smaller val-
ues of the synergy factor r. This extends the credibility of the
strong reciprocity model, and it indicates that, if at all, the
evolutionary advantages of correlated positive and negative
reciprocity ought to manifest clearer under extreme adversity.
8In future experiments, it may thus be worthwhile working to-
wards such conditions if the goal is to possibly discern some
more actual advantages of correlated reciprocities, and to thus
further support the assumptions of the strong reciprocity the-
ory also with empirical data. A warning to end the presen-
tation of results is, however, in order. As the series of final
snapshots presented in Fig. 10 clearly demonstrates (and to no
lesser extent also the series of snapshots presented in Fig. 4),
conditions for pattern formation and complex strategic config-
urations need to be given for the subtle solutions, here identi-
fied by means of extensive and systematic Monte Carlo simu-
lations, to emerge and be stable. Such conditions appear to be
very difficult to achieve in experiments with humans, which is
why efforts towards large-scale implementations, as recently
reported in [22, 63], are very encouraging and certainly worth
developing further in the future.
IV. DISCUSSION
Our goal in the present paper was to determine whether
there are evolutionary advantages associated by correlating
positive and negative reciprocity in a single strategy, as op-
posed to adopting solely reward or punishment as an elemen-
tary strategy. Systematic Monte Carlo simulations have re-
vealed that, regardless of the synergy factor governing the
public goods game, elementary strategies, and punishment in
particular, are in general significantly more effective in de-
terring defection than the combined strategy. Although there
exist narrow and rather unrealistic parameter regions where
the correlation of positive and negative reciprocity can out-
perform a particular elementary strategy, these advantages are
highly unlikely to play a role in human experiments, and they
also frequently come second to the evolutionary success that
is warranted by punishment alone under the same conditions.
The presented results thus lend support to the empirical data
published in [27, 28], which fail to support the central assump-
tion of the strong reciprocity model that negative and positive
reciprocity are correlated.
The studied four-strategy spatial public goods game gives
rise to fascinating evolutionary outcomes that are separated
by continuous and discontinuous phase transitions. We have
demonstrated, for example, that indirect territorial competi-
tion may lend some credibility to the combined strategy, as the
latter is sometimes more effective against the defectors than
solely rewarding. In special parameter regions, the combina-
tion of positive and negative reciprocity can thus crowd out
cooperators that reward other cooperators. Under the same
conditions, however, cooperators that punish but do not re-
ward can be more effective still, so overall it is difficult to
argue in favor of choosing the combined strategy over an ele-
mentary one. Moreover, stationary solutions that are governed
by indirect territorial competition terminate suddenly via dis-
continuous phase transitions, and accordingly, they are diffi-
cult to identify and are unlikely to seriously challenge conclu-
sions based on empirical data.
For low synergy factors, we have shown that the sponta-
neous emergence of cyclic dominance between strategies D,
P andB is also a possible solution of the system, and indeed it
significantly extends the parameter region where the correla-
tion of positive and negative reciprocity is viable. Within the
cyclic phase defectors outperform punishers, punishers out-
perform the combined strategy, and the combined strategy is
able to invade defectors, thereby closing the loop of domi-
nance. In this case, it can again be argued in favor of the com-
bined strategy over solely rewarding, but since the remaining
three strategies become spontaneously entailed in a cycle of
dominance, the advantage warranted by the correlation of neg-
ative and positive reciprocity is indirect and circumstantial at
best. Furthermore, we have demonstrated that the cyclic dom-
inance can terminate in very different ways. Either the aver-
age fraction of one strategy vanishes, or, more intriguingly,
the amplitude of oscillations diverges in a system-size inde-
pendent manner. Thus, although the average fractions of all
three strategies are far from zero, the cyclic dominance phase
may end abruptly via a discontinuous phase transition. Al-
though phenomena like indirect territorial competition, cyclic
dominance, divergent fluctuations of the amplitude of oscil-
lations, as well as previously reported critical phenomena in
evolutionary games [64], self-organized adaptation [65, 66]
and in-group favoritism [67], are all of significant interest to
physicist, we emphasize that they would likely require mas-
sive efforts to be observed in human experiments. Neverthe-
less, recent large-scale attempts in this direction promise ex-
citing times ahead [22, 63].
Lastly, it remains to emphasize that punishment is the el-
ementary strategy that is definitively more effective than the
combined strategy, while rewarding is not necessarily so.
However, rewarding can be made much more potent if re-
wards are administered not to all cooperators, but only to those
who themselves reward others. In this case, rewarding can
completely outperform punishment at low γ and high β val-
ues, while the situation reverses only if the costs become rel-
atively high compared to the rewards and fines. Yet in this
modified scenario, the act of punishing yields no extra advan-
tages, and in general the strategy B can survive only when
the strategy R can survive too. Therefore, even under such al-
tered, rewarding-friendly conditions, there are still no notable
evolutionary advantages to be gained by adopting a strategy
that combines both positive and negative reciprocity. With
this conclusion, we hope that our study will inspire further re-
search aimed at investigating the role of correlated strategies
in evolutionary games, and we also hope that more experi-
mental work will be carried out to clarify their role by the
evolution of human cooperation.
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POPULAR SUMMARY
Widespread cooperation among unrelated individuals dis-
tinguishes humans markedly from other species. The origins
of our remarkable other-regarding abilities have been associ-
ated with between-group conflicts as well as with alloparental
care and provisioning for someone else’s young, all of which
were pressing challenges that during the Paleolithic age and
beyond could not be met by individual efforts. But in the ab-
sence of such challenges, what keeps us cooperating? Reci-
procity is long considered an important piece of the puzzle. If
someone is kind to us, we tend to be kind in return. Similarly,
if someone is unfair or exploitative, we retaliate without much
sympathy. And according to the strong reciprocity hypothesis,
this positive and negative reciprocity are correlated to give us
optimal evolutionary predispositions for the successful evolu-
tion of cooperation. But is this really true? Recent human
experiments reject the hypothesis, and everyday experiences
leave us with the impression that people either tend to reward
success or punish wrongdoing, but seldom will they do both.
We show how methods of statistical physics resolve the dis-
agreement between theory and observations.
We perform Monte Carlo simulations of the public goods
game, where besides defectors, cooperators have the option
to reward, punish, or do both. The question we focus on is
whether doing both confers an evolutionary advantage to in-
dividuals adopting such a correlated strategy. The evolution-
ary game gives rise to indirect territorial competition, spon-
taneous emergence of cyclic dominance, as well as diver-
gent fluctuations of oscillations that terminate in an absorbing
phase. All these are fascinatingly complex solutions that high-
light the importance of collective behavior, pattern formation,
and structure in human cooperation. Yet despite the richness
of evolutionary outcomes, the correlated strategy can survive
only in very narrow and rather unrealistic parameter regions.
Rewarding or punishing only is far superior and more effec-
tive in deterring defection. Presented results thus lend sup-
port to the outcome of recent human experiments, which fail
to support the strong reciprocity hypothesis that positive and
negative reciprocity are correlated.
Our study demonstrates the usage of statistical physics in
evolutionary games with correlated strategies, and we hope
it will inspire more theoretical and experimental work aimed
at clarifying their role by the evolution of human coopera-
tion. The richness of the results and associated phase dia-
grams might also attract the attention of the broader physics
community to be inspired by the complexity and beauty of the
physics of non-equilibrium systems that address fundamental
social and biological problems.
